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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

]
1

Case No. 890459-CA

1ST ROBERT MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established
by 78-2a~3(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of
Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Commitment from the
Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, State of Utah, the
Honorable

J. Philip

Eves

presiding.

The

conviction

is

for

distribution of a counterfeit substance, a Second-Degree Felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Was there sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant
of the offense of distribution of a counterfeit substance; is the
distribution of a counterfeit substance unconstitutional vague.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES
The provision which is believed to be determinative in
this

matter

amended.

is

58-37-8(1),

Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953,

as

This statute is reproduced in total as the addendum to

this brief.
1

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of
Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Commitment dated
June 27, 1989, and signed by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, judge
of the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, State of Utah.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The Defendant was convicted by jury verdict on May 12,
1989, of the offense of distribution of a counterfeit substance,
amphetamines or methamphetamines.
serve

one

to

fifteen

years

in

The Defendant was sentenced to
the

Utah

State

Prison. The

execution of that sentence was stayed, and the Defendant was
placed on probation.

A condition of probation was that the

Defendant serve fifteen (15) days in the Iron County Jail, which
jail-time has been served.

The Defendant remains on probation.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The Defendant was convicted of a Second-Degree Felony
of

distribution

of

a

counterfeit

substance

and

placed

on

probation by the trial court for a period of thirty-six (36)
months.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 21, 1988, a confidential informant working for
the State of Utah and working with agent Pat McCarthy of the
State of Utah Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement Bureau met
with the Defendant, Ernest Robert Miller, at the Sportsman's
Lounge in Cedar City.

Mr. Miller is employed at that business by

his father who owns the lounge. (T.101)
2

The State's agent,

Mr. McCarthy, approached Mr. Miller, who was collecting cover
charges at the front door, and asked Mr. Miller if he "knew any
body in the bar who could get the informant and myself some
speed". (T.45)

After a period of some minutes, during which

Mr. Miller danced with the confidential informant accompanying
agent McCarthy, Mr. Miller told the agent, " I can get you some
speed, but all I have are some 'crosstops', and they're my own,
and they are at my house, and I can't get them for you until
after the bar closes." (T.48)

At approximately 1:05 a.m. on July

21, 1988, the confidential informant, Agent McCarthy, and the
Defendant left the Sportsman's bar in two vehicles and drove to
the Defendant's home.

(T.49)

Inside the home Mr. Miller took

the informant and the agent into his kitchen, reached up into an
overhead cupboard, and removed a small cellophane package. (T.50)
Mr. Miller then gave the package to the informant who gave it to
agent McCarthy.

(T.50)

The package contained ten white tablets

which were perpendicularly
formation.

(T.50)

scored across the top in a cross

The Defendant informed the agent that there

was no charge for the tablets.

(T.50)

He also told the agent

that he could obtain additional similar tablets at the price of
$10.00 per

100 or

200 tablets

for

$20.00.

(T.50-51)

The

Defendant also told the agent that the agent would probable have
to take more than the ten pills in order to get "any type of good
feeling out of the pills".

(T.51) The tablets were later tested

and

controlled

found

to

contain

no

substances. (T.96)

The

State's chemist, Mr. Kevin Smith, also testified "If there is
3

going to be a controlled substance in a white scored tablet, it's
going to be amphetimine.
white

double-scored

Mr. Smith's
ephedrine,

tablet,

testing
a

In one case, I found a barbiturate in a

did

mild

but

that's

an

that

the

disclose
stimulant,

and

exception." (T.96)
tablets

not

a

contained
controlled

substance. (T.96-97)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is insufficient evidence to support a conviction
of the Defendant in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION
OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF A COUNTERFEIT
SUBSTANCE.
58-37-2(5),

Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953,

as

amended,

defines a counterfeit substance as follows:
(a) Any substance or container or labeling of any
substance
that
without
authorization
bears
the
trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark,
imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, of a
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the
person
or
persons
who
in
fact
manufactured,
distributed, or dispensed the substance which falsely
purports to be a controlled substance distributed by,
any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or
(b)
Any substance that is represented to be a
controlled substance.
In this particular case, the jury was
jury
any

instruction
substance

number

that

10 that, "counterfeit

is falsely

represented

instructed

substance

to be

a

in

means

controlled

substance.If
In the dealings between the State's agent, Mr. McCarthy
4

and the Defendant, the terms "speed" and "crosstops" were used to
refer to the items actually given to agent McCarthy.

Nowhere in

the transcript is there any record that the Defendant ever told
agent McCarthy that he was receiving the controlled substance
amphetamine or the controlled substance methamphetamine.
The difficulties faced by the Defendant in a case of
this nature is the use of slang terms in order to refer to
specifically defined substances within the controlled substance
act.

The process becomes more complicated when the State's agent

refers to something with a slang term, and the Defendant refers
to another slang term.

The two may intentionally be speaking

about totally different substances.

The State's agent used the

term "speed" to mean amphetamines or methamphetamines in this
case.

However, the State's agent himself defines "speed" as "any

central nervous system stimulant that provides a speeding up of
certain body
(T.45)

functions such as respiration

The State's

agent also was

and heart beat."

familiar with the term

"crosstops", but stated at one point in the transcript that
"speed" and "crosstops" are "diametrically opposed terms".

The

issue becomes more clouded when the agent begins to use the term
"narcotics".

It

is

all

too

often

the

case

that

the term

"narcotic" is used interchangeably with the statutorily defined
term of controlled substance.

Narcotics are a specific class of

drug which are either derivatives of opium or manufactured to be
chemically similar to opium derivatives.

The use of narcotics in

the medical field is basically as a pain reliever.(see Webster's
5

Third

New

World

Dictionary,

Unabridged,

1981)

This

is

a

radically different class of drugs with a substantially different
effect

from

the

amphetamines

and

methamphetamines

referred to by the Defendant in the case at bar.

allegedly

The difficulty

in the terminology in this case is further pointed out when the
Statefs agent defines a controlled substance as "any substance
that is controlled and scheduled and has a legitimate medical
purpose, as far as being on a medical schedule.
One, Schedule Two, and such". (T.77)

Either Schedule

The mistake made by the

agent is that the substances listed in Schedule One have no
accepted medical use whatsoever and are completely prohibited in
their

uses.

Schedule

One

substances

include

narcotics,

hallucinogenics, stimulants, and other drugs which have only
abuse potential and no accepted medical use.
The use of slang terminology to refer to specifically
defined controlled controlled substances makes cases of this type
extremely difficult to analyze.

The apparent operative words in

this case are the words "speed" and "crosstop".

The State's

agent, in testifying, said that the two terms were diametrically
opposed (T. 63), and that "speed" was any central nervous system
stimulant (T. 45) while "crosstops" contain ephedrine which is
not a controlled

substance. (T.84)

An analysis

of the word

"junk" can point out the difficulties shown in this case.

The

term "junk" is often referred as a description of the controlled
substance heroin which is a schedule one controlled substance
under the Utah Controlled Substances Act.
6

However, the term

"junk" is also referred to as refuse, trash, or garbage.

There

are individuals who are constantly engaged in the business of
being

"junk dealers" who cannot reasonably

be deemed

to be

engaged in the false representation of anything as a controlled
substance.
The use of the term counterfeit substance in this case
would

apparently

give the discretion of defining

substance solely to the agent involved.

counterfeit

If the agent asks an

individual for anything and refers to the item with use of a
slang term, and the individual responds by giving another item
also referred to in a slang term, it is only the judgment of the
State's agent that establishes the parameters of the prescribed
conduct.

Such a broad definition of criminal conduct may be

constitutionally suspect where criminal conduct may be defined in
terms of an agent's perception and subjective judgment rather
than by objective observable fact.
The

facts

in

this

case,

however,

point

out

the

vagueness problems with this statute when one leaves the safe
realm of the defined controlled substances.

The terms "speed"

and "crosstops" may or may not be the equivalent to "controlled
substances."

In that circumstance, the proscribed conduct can

only be guessed at by a person of ordinary intelligence standing
in the position of a reasonable man.
The writer of this brief cannot find support for a
constitutional challenge to the statute in question.

A recent

Colorado case, People v. Moore, 674 P.2d 354 (Colo.,1984) upheld
7

the constitutionality of a similar statute, and it is clear that
there are a large number of factual patterns which would support
a conviction of distribution of a counterfeit substance under the
present statutory language.

For this reason the Appellant must

urge upon this Court the argument that the evidence in this case
is not sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

This is perhaps

the most onerous burden required of a Defendant on appeal.

This

Court is bound to favorably view the jury's verdict and to
resovle any and all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d

443

(Utah, 1983);

State

v. Webb, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, July 21, 1989.
Still, the evidence in this case, when reduced to its
simplest form will not support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
conviction

of

the

Defendant/Appellant.

The

agent

asked

for

"speed" which he defined as any central nervous system stimulant
and not exclusively a controlled substance.

The Defendant gave

the agent "crosstops" and there was no representation that the
"crosstops" contained a controlled substance. (T. 85)

Neither

the Defendant nor the State's agent used the words "amphetamine"
or "methamphetamine".

Unfortunatley, the Defendant was convicted

of distributing a counterfeit substance because he represented
ephedrine to be "crosstops", whatever that term means.

CONCLUSION
Because the Defendant/Appellant has been convicted of
this

offense

by

a

jury

verdict
8

relying

upon

insufficient

evidence, the Judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
this Court's order issue to the District Court to dismiss the
matter, (see State v. Webb, supra.)
DATED this

/ Q

day of November, 1989.

JMJES L. SHUMATE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Paul
Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, this f ^

day of November, 1989, first

class postage fully prepaid.
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ADDENDUM

58-37-8.

P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s [Effective
until J u l y 1, lf)<H>J.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is
unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or
to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the
course of his business as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescription; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or
II is guilty of a second degree felony and
upon a second or subsequent conviction of
Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree
felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III
or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection
is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a
second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
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